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2Abstract. We investigate the paths of pure strategy profiles induced by the
fictitious play process. We present rules that such paths must follow. Using these rules
we prove that every non-degenerate1 2x3 game has the continuous fictitious play
property, that is, every continuous fictitious play process, independent of initial actions
and beliefs, approaches equilibrium in such games.
1. Introduction
Consider n  players that play repeatedly a game in strategic form. Each player has
subjective beliefs about other players’ future behavior. In each period each player
chooses a best response according to his belief and updates his belief  according to the
past observations. We call such a process a belief-based learning process.
The basic belief based learning process is the fictitious play (FP) process proposed by
Brown in 1951. In a FP process each player believes that each one of his opponents is
using a stationary mixed strategy which is the empirical distribution of this opponent’s
past actions. Most of the research about the FP proc ss has focused on the questions,
whether players’ beliefs  approach equilibrium. A game in which every FP proc ss,
independent of initial actions and beliefs, approaches equilibrium, is called a game with
the FP property.
Every learning process is a pair ( , )X B , where X is a path of pure strategy profiles,
and B is a belief sequence. If we eliminate all successive repetitions in the path X, we
get a new path of pure profiles which we call the reduced path. Studying reduced paths
of the fictitious play process teaches us a lot about properties of the process. We
present four rules which are called the four principles of motion that such paths must
follow :
1. The improvement principle : Given a two person game, if the players are moving
from the pure strategy profile x  to the pure strategy profile y , then for each
player i for which y xi i¹ , y i is better for player i than x i versus x i- .
2. The stability principle2 : If at some stage of the process the players choose a pure
strategy equilibrium strategy x , then they will choose this x from this stage on.
                                                 
1 A game G is non-degenerate, if the payoff function of each player is one-to-one function for every
joint strategy of his opponents.
2 This is a simplification of the analogous principle established by Fudenberg and Kreps (1991).
33. The separation principle : If the players move from x to y and y xi i¹ , then x i
and y i  are not separated in the sense that B x B yi i( ) ( )I ¹ Æ , where B x i( )is the
set of all mixed strategy profiles of player i's opponents against which x i s a best
response for player i .
4. The reduction principle : Given a two person game, if the players do not use
some strategies from a certain stage on, and if the sub game obtained by
eliminating these unused  strategies is a 2 2x game, then the process approaches
equilibrium.
We use these rules  to prove either existence or non-existence of the FP property for
some games.  In particular, using these rules we introduce a simple proof to the well
known example of Shapley (1964) which is an example to a class of games without
the FP property. On the other hand we use these rules in order to prove that every
non-degenerate 2 3x  game has the FP property in the continuous (time) case.
 Indeed we know just about few classes of games with the FP property . Zero-sum
games, i.e., bimatrix games of the form ( , )A A-  (Robinson (1951)). Games with
identical payoff functions, i.e., games in which all the players have the same payoff
matrix  (Monderer and Shapley(1996)). Games which are dominance solvable
(Milgrom and Roberts (1991)). Games with strategic complementarities and
diminishing  returns (Krishna (1992)). 2x2 Games (Miyasawa (1964)). The results of
Miyasawa (1964) have been proved under certain indifference breaking rules.
Monderer and Sela (1996) have shown that if we do not assume any  tie breaking rules
about the particular best response at each stage (when the best response is not unique),
there is a 2x2 game that does not have the FP property. In order to avoid such extreme
cases we deal with non-degenerate games. Every 2x2 non-degenerate game has the FP
property (see Monderer and Shapley (1996))3. The current conjecture is that  this
result can be extended for 2xn  games, n > 2. As was mentioned, we affirm part of
this conjecture. Using the four principles of motion, we prove that every 2x3 non-
degenerate game has the CFP property (the FP property for the continuous case). In
this case we find it convenient to work with the continuous time formulation of
fictitious Play (CFP) rather than the discrete time formulation (FP). In some cases the
                                                 
3 Monderer and Shapley (1993) give a new proof for the FP property of such games.
4CFP is more natural and more practical than the FP. For instance, the convergence of
the FP in zero-sum games, which require a complex proof for the discrete process
(Robinson (1951)), can be proved easily for the continuous case (Hofbauer (1994)).
Although there are no results relating the discrete and the continuous processes, it
seems that whenever the CFP xist, the FP’s path behaves similarly to the continuous
one.
2. Notation
Let N n= { , , ,..., }012 be the set of players. For each i NÎ , S i is the finite strategy set
of player i . For every M NÍ  we denote S SM
i M
i=
Î
X . In particular we denote
S S
i N
i=
Î
X  and S Si
j N i
i-
Î
= X
\{}
. Let U S Ri: ® be player i's  payoff function, where
R denotes the set of real numbers. For each finite set A  we denote by D( )A  the set of
probability measures over A . For M NÍ  we denote D DM
i M
iS=
Î
X ( )  and
D DJ
M MS= ( ). The set of player i's mixed strategies D( )S i  is denoted by Di . We
denote D D- =i N i\{}andD DJ
i
J
N i- = \{}. We identify x Si iÎ  and x Si i- -Î  with extreme
points in Di  and D J
i- respectively.
3.  No-Cycling Conditions
We define four order relations over S :
1. x yf 1  if there exists a player i  such that x y
i i- -=  and U x U yi i( ) ( )> .
2. x yf 2  if there exists a non-empty set of players M  such that x y
M M- -=  and
U x y U yi i i i( , ) ( )- >  for every i MÎ .
3. x yf 3  if there exists a player i such that x y
i i- -=  and x i  is a best response to
y i- .
4. x yf 4  if there exists a non-empty set of players M  such that x y
M M- -= and x i
is a best response to y i- for every i MÎ .
The order relations are related according to the next diagram :
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A path in S  is a sequence,X x t t= ³( ( )), 0, of elements in S . The path is
k - increasing , 1 4£ £k , if x t x tk( ) ( )+1 f  for every t ³ 1.
A path which is  k - increasing, k = 12,  is called path generated by the better reply
dynamic. And a path which is k - increasing, k = 34,  is called path generated by the
best reply dynamic.
We say  that a game G  satisfies the k -no-cycling condition or G is k - acyclic if
every k - increasing sequence is finite4. The set of all k -no-cycling games is denoted
by NC k( ) . The relations between these sets of games are :
NC NC
NC NC
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
3 4
1 2
    
                
    
É
É
U U
The following example shows a game that satisfies the 3-no cycling condition and does
not satisfy the 1-no-cycling condition. Similarly it can be shown that all inclusion
relations in the above diagram  are strict.
Example 3.1
Let
G =
- -
- - -
é
ë
ê
ê
ê
ù
û
ú
ú
ú
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
100 102 0 10
06 09 155
20 1 23 144
Denote by (i,j) the point in G such that, the row player chooses row i and the column
player chooses column j. The cycle:
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )11 12 32 33 23 21 11® ® ® ® ® ®  is generated 1-increasing.
A simple inspection reveals that there are no 3-cycles5.
The games G U U U n( , ,..., )1 2  and G V V V n( , ,..., )1 2  ( U i and V i denote player i ’s
utility functions) are better reply equivalent if for every player i , U xi i( ) , -  and
                                                 
4 Monderer and Shapley (1993) called a “1-increasing path” an “improvement path” and they called a
1-acyclic game a “game with the finite improvement property”.
6V xi i( ) , - induce the same preference relation on S i  for every x Si i- -Î . The games
are best reply equivalent if for every player i , U xi i( ) , -  and V xi i( ) , -  attain their
maximal values at the same subset of S i  for every x Si i- -Î .
The game G is non-degenerate  if for every i , U xi i( ) , -  is a one-to-one function for
every x Si i- -Î .
Monderer and Shapley  (1996) showed that a non-degenerate game belongs to NC(1)
if and only if it is better reply equivalent in pure strategies to a game with identical
payoff  functions. The analogous result can be similarly proved for the f 3 r lation.
Lemma 3.2: A non-degenerate game satisfies the 3-no-cycling condition if and only if
it is best reply equivalent in pure strategies to a game with identical payoff functions6.
The following example appears in Monderer and Shapley (1996). It shows the
necessity of the “non-degenerate game” requirement in Lemma 3.2 :
Example 3.3:
G U U( , )
( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , )
1 2
00 10
10 01
=
é
ë
ê
ù
û
ú
If G U U( , )1 2  is best reply equivalent to G U U( , ), then the following contradiction
follows :
U U U U U( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )11 21 22 12 11< < < = .
4. Fictitious  Play Process
There are two versions of the FP process. In the first version each player believes that
each one of his opponents is using a stationary mixed strategy which is the empirical
distribution of this opponent’s past actions. Such a player will be called a IFP player
( “I” stands for Independent ). In the second version, each player believes that his
opponents are using a joint correlated mixed strategy, which is the empirical
distribution of his opponents’ past actions. Such a player will be called a  JFP player
                                                                                                                                
5 Actually, this game has strategic complementarities and diminishing returns and therefore by
Krishna (1992) it belongs to NC(3).
6 Actually the “best reply” version can be proved for every class of games as well. We just need that
the best reply correspondences (in pure strategies) are single values.
7( “J” stands for Joint ). In two person games, the concepts of IFP player and  JFP
player coincide. Since most of the research on FP process concentrated in two-person
games, the difference between JFP a d IFP has been hardly noticed. In this paper we
refer to the IFP as FP.
A belief sequence B b t= { ( )}, for t ³ 1, consist of elements of X
i n
i
Î
-D , i.e.
b t i Ni i( ) Î Î-D  , , is the belief of player i about the other players’ strategies at stage
t . b t i kk
i k( ) ,Î ¹D  ,  is the belief of player i about player k's strategy at stage t .  
A joint belief sequence B b t= { ( )}, for t ³ 1, consist of elements of X
i n
J
i
Î
-D , i.e.
b t i Ni J
i( ) ,Î Î-D   , is the belief of player i about the joint strategy of the other players
at stage t .
Let b ti J
i( )Î -D and M N iÍ \{}. Denote by b tM
i
{ }( )the marginal distribution on M .
That is , b t x b x x tM
i M i M
x S N M i
{ }( )( ) ( , )( )
\{ , }
=
Î
å .
A learning process is a pair ( , )X B , where X is a path in S , and B is a belief
sequence or joint belief sequence, such that for every t ³ 1 and every player i , the
strategy x ti ( ) is a best response to b ti ( ).
A learning process ( , )X B is a fictitious play (FP) process, if for every player i , and
for every k i¹ , b t
t
x s tk
i k
s
t
( ) ( )= ³
=
-
å1 1
0
1
  , , ( here x sk ( ) is a point in Dk  ).
Note that in a FP process b t b tk
i
k
s( ) ( )=  for all i k s k¹ ¹ and . We denote by tk ( )the
identical belief of all the players about player k s'  strategy at stage t  .
A FP process ( , )X B approaches equilibrium, if for every e > 0 there exist t0 0> ,
such that for every t t³ 0 , there exist a mixed equilibrium profile p
NÎD , such that,
( ( ), ( ),..., ( ))b t b t b t pn1 2 - < e  .
We say that a game has the FP property , if every FP process, independent of initial
actions and beliefs, approaches equilibrium.
A learning process ( , )X B is a joint fictitious play (JFP) process, if for every player i ,
b t
t
x s ti i
s
t
( ) ( ) ,= ³-
=
-
å1 1
0
1
  ,  ( here x si- ( ) is a point in D J
i- ).
8Note that in a JFP process, for every two players i k¹ , and for all M N i kÍ \{, },
b t b tM
i
M
k
{ } { }( ) ( )= . We denote by tk ( )the identical belief of all the players about player
k ’s strategy at stage t .
5. The Four Principles of Motion
Every learning process is a pair ( , )X B , where X  is a path of pure strategy profiles
and B is a belief sequence. If we eliminate all successive repetitions in the path of pure
profiles we get a new path of pure profiles which we call the r duced path. For
instance, x y x z y, , , ,  is  the reduced path of x y y x x x z z y, , , , , , , , .
By investigation  the reduced paths structure induced by the FP process, we obtain
four principles of motion  that such paths must follow in non-degenerate games.
1. The Improvement Principle: Consider a two person game. The reduced path of
pure strategies generated by a FP process is 2-increasing7.
Proof : It suffices to show that if  x t x t( ) ( )¹ -1 then for every player
  i M t k N x t x tk kÎ = Î ¹ -( ) { : ( ) ( )}1 ,  U x t x t U x ti i i i( ( ), ( )) ( ( ))- - > -1 1  .
Indeed, note that  U x t b t U x t b ti i i i i i( ( ), ( )) ( ( ), ( ))- - ³ -1 2 2 , and
U x t b t U x t b ti i i i i i( ( ), ( )) ( ( ), ( ))- ³ - -1 1 1 . As b ti ( )-1  is a convex combination of
b ti ( )- 2  and x ti- -( )1 , and the game is non-degenerate, the result follows. n
Corollary 5.1: Every 2-acyclic game has the FP property.
The class of 2-acyclic games is quite restricted. The following example (due to Foster
and Young (1995)) give us a reasonable doubt  about the conjecture that  corollary 5.1
is valid also for 1-acyclic games :
                                                 
7 The reduced path generated by a JFP process is 2-increasing for every n n,  ³ 1, player game.
9G =
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
2424 66 018 018 180 180 50 00
66 2424 018 018 180 180 40 00
180 180 2424 66 018 018 30 00
180 180 66 2424 018 018 ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
20 00
018 018 180 180 2424 66 10 00
018 018 180 180 66 2424 00 00
04 05 02 03 00 01 2524 25 25
00 00 00 00
- -
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )00 00 25 25 2425- -
é
ë
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ù
û
ú
ú
ú
ú
ú
ú
ú
ú
ú
ú
ú
Foster and Young (1995) introduced this game as an example of a coordination two
player game without the FP property. This game is not 1-acyclic game and therefore
this game is not a counter example to the conjecture that every 1-acyclic game has the
FP property. Still, the reduced path generated by a FP in this case is :
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ).....12 21 34 43 56 65 12® ® ® ® ® ®
This path is 2-increasing. Therefore the question whether a game is either 1-acyclic  or
not seems irrelevant . Further, by the Improvement principle we show that the reduced
path generated by a FP is a better reply dynamic. We can see by this  example  that the
reduced path generated by the FP process is not necessarily a best reply dynamic for
some stage on.
Shapley’s Example
Now, we proceed to show an application of the improvement principle. Consider the
following  game satisfying the ordinal properties of Shapley (1964):
G
a b b a
b a a b
a b b a
1
00
00
00
=
é
ë
ê
ê
ê
ù
û
ú
ú
ú
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
    where a b> > 0 , and a b< 2 .
Proposition (Shapley, 1964) :  G1does not have the FP property.
We prove this result by the improvement principle :
Proof :  This game has a unique equilibrium ( , )p q xÎD D1 2, where p q= = ( , , )
1
3
1
3
1
3
.
Therefore, If a FP process approaches equilibrium it must actually converges to
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( , )p q . Consider  a process starting from one of the non-zero entries. We show that
this process does not converge to ( , )p q .
Consider the following game G2 obtained by adding a 4
th row to G1 :
G
a b b a
b a a b
a b b a
c c c
2
00
00
00
0 0 0
=
é
ë
ê
ê
ê
ê
ù
û
ú
ú
ú
ú
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( ,
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
where 
a b
c b
+
< <
3
.
By the improvement principle ( because b c< ), player 1 never chooses the 4th  row.
Therefore the process generates the same play of pure strategies in G1and G2.
Suppose in negation that the process converges to ( , )p q  in G1, then it must converge
to ( , )p q  in G2, where p p p p= ( , , , )1 2 3 0 . Note that  the 4
th  row is the unique best
reply of player 1 to q . Therefore it is the unique best reply to mixed strategies of
player 2 that are sufficiently close to q . Hence, if The FP converges to ( , )p q , player
1 eventually switches to the 4th  row, contradicting the improvement principle. n
The proof  of the non-approach result for the generalized fictitious play in the
examples given by Deschamps, Elison and Fudenberg is very similar (simpler actually)
so we omit it.
Let   G
a b b a c
b a a b c
a b b a c
c c c d d
=
é
ë
ê
ê
ê
ê
ù
û
ú
ú
ú
ú
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
00 0
00 0
00 0
0 0 0
Where d a b c
a b
> > > >
+
>
3
0.
Note that by the improvement principle, in every FP process starting at one of the
( , )a b  or ( , )b a  entries, the players will not use their 4th  strategies. On the other hand,
the unique equilibrium in this game is attained at the ( , )d  entry.
The second principle  is an immediate conclusion of the improvement principle :
2. The Stability Principle: If a pure strategy equilibrium is played at some stage in
11
a FP process, then it is played from this stage on for ever.
Denote by B x x S i( ), Î , the set of all joint mixed strategy profiles in D- i aga st which
x is best reply. We now establish the third principle :
3. The Separation Principle: Let x  and y  be pure strategies of playeri .Suppose
that B x B y( ) ( ) and do not intersect. Then in every FP process, for sufficiently late
stage, player i will never change its choice from x t  y  and vice versa.
Proof : The distance between two successive beliefs of player i , b ti ( ) and b ti ( )+1 is
at most 
2
1t +
. Therefore, if player i chooses x at stage t, he will not choose y in the
next dt stages, where d is the distance between the sets B x( )and B y( ) . n
The fourth principle is derived from  Miyasawa’s proof (1961) about the existence of
the FP property in 2 2x  games
4. The Reduction Games: Consider a two person game. If the reduced path
generated by a FP process always lies for t T³  in the strategy profile set of a
MxN sub game, where M N+ £ 4. Then the process approaches equilibrium8.
6. Continuous Fictitious Play (CFP)
We find it convenient to work with the continuous time formulation of fictitious play
rather than the discrete time formulation, in order to prove the existence of the FP
property for all non-degenerate 2 3x  games. Although there are no results relating the
discrete and the continuous processes, it seems that whenever the continuous fic itious
play exist, the fictitious play’s path behaves similarly to the continuous one. Since our
proof based on the four principles of motion relating to both processes, we assume that
this result holds for the discrete case as well.
While the time space is continuous, a path x in S is a right continuous function
x S:[0, )¥ ®  such that the set of discontinuity points of x does not have an
accumulation point in [0, )¥ .
                                                 
8 We conjecture that this principle holds for every sub-game with the FP property. That is, for every
MxN sub-game such that M ³ 1and N ³ 1.
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A belief  path is a pair ( , )b t1 , where t1 0> , and b t:[ , )1 ¥ ® D  is the belief function.
A continuous learning process is a pair ( ,( , ))x b t1 , where x is a path in S , and ( , )b t1
is a belief path, such that x ti ( ) is a best response to b ti ( )for every t t³ 1.
A continuous learning process ( ,( , ))x b t1  is a  continuous fictitious play (CFP)
process, if for every i , and for every j i¹ , b t x s dsj
i j
s
t
( ) ( )=
=
ò
0
, for every t t³ 1.
A CFP ( ,( , ))x b t1  process approaches equilibrium if for every e > 0 there exist t0 0> ,
such that for every t t³ 0 , there exist a mixed equilibrium profile p
NÎD , such that,
(( ( ), ( ),..., ( ))b t b t b t pn1 2 - < e  .
We say that a game has the CFP property , if every CFP process, independent of initial
actions and beliefs, approaches equilibrium.
Let ( ,( , ))x b t1  be a CFP process. Since x  is right continuous and takes values in a
finite set S , it must be a step function. Further, since x  has only finite number of
discontinuity points at any bounded interval, there exists an increasing sequence
{ }T k kk  , 0£ £  of times (2£ £ ¥k ), where 0 0 1 1£ < =T t T , that will be called the
reduced time sequence. Likewise, there exists a sequence { }z k kk  , 0£ £ , in S that
will be called the reduced path, such that :
(6.1)  z k z k k k( ) ( )¹ - £ £1 2 , .
(6.2)  z k x t T t T k kk k( ) ( )= £ < £ £+ ,  , 1 0 ,
where T
k + = ¥1 if k is finite.
It can be verified that the four principles of motion for the FP process  hold for the
CFP as well. Further, The improvement, stability, and separation principles can be
shown by the same arguments as in the discrete case. For the reduction principle see
the discussion in the following section.
7. 2x2 Games
The result of Miyasawa (1961) that every 2 2x game has the FP property proved under
a tie-breaking rule about the particular best reply at each period (when there are some
13
best replies). Without tie-breaking rules, Monderer and Shapley (1996)  showed that
every 2 2x game that satisfies the diagonal property 9 is best response equivalent in
mixed strategies to either a game with identical payoff functions ( , )A A , or to a zero-
sum game ( , )A A- . Therefore every such game has the FP property. Hofbauer (1994)
showed that every two person zero-sum game has the CFP property. Likewise, it can
be verified  that every  game with identical payoff functions, and particularly every
two person 2 2x game has the CFP property10. Hence, every 2 2x  game with the
diagonal property has the CFP property. If  a game does not have the diagonal
property, it implies that for one of the players has either dominated strategy, or
identical strategies. The case of dominated strategies is easy to analyze. The harder
case is where there are identical strategies. As was shown by Monderer and Sela
(1996) there is  such a 2 2x  game without the FP property. It can be shown that this
game does not have also the CFP property. Hence, we discuss only about non-
degenerate games. Every 2 2x  non-degenerate game is either a game with dominated
strategies, or a game with the diagonal property, and therefore weobtain the following
result :
Corollary 7: Every non-degenerate 2 2x game has the CFP property.
8. 2x3 Games
We conjecture that corollary 7.1 holds for every 2 2xk k , >  non-degenerate game. By
the principles of motion  we affirm this conjecture for the case  k = 3:
Theorem 8.1: Every non-degenerate 2x3 game has the CFP property.
Proof :  Let G1 be a 2 3x  game as follows :
G A B
a b a b a b
a b a b a b1
11 11 12 12 13 13
21 21 22 22 23 23
= =
é
ë
ê
ù
û
ú( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
                                                 
9 We say that a game G A B a i j b i j i j= = =( , ) ( ( , ), ( , )) , 1
2  has the diagonal property if c ¹ 0and
d ¹ 0 where,
d b b b b c a a a a= - - + = - - +( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )10 21 12 22 11 21 12 22 and  .
10 In the following we actually need only the existence of the reduction principle in the continuous
case for zero-sum 2 2x sub-game. This result is derived from Hofbauer (1994).
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Without loss of generality we assume that b b b11 12 13> > . We can assume that there are
no strictly dominated strategies ( non-degenerate game does not have weakly
dominated strategies ). Thus, b b b23 22 21> > . We can apply utility transformation that
do not change the best response structure of the game. In particular, we can multiply a
payoff matrix by a positive constant. We can also add a constant to a column in A ,
and we can add a constant to a row in B . Applying these transformations to G1 yields:
G
a w b c z
u v
a b c z w v u2
0
0 00 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0=
é
ë
ê
ù
û
ú ¹ ¹ ¹ > < < >
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
, , , , , ,           .
Depending on the signs of a b c,  and , there are eight different forms of G2. But there
are only four different better response structures (each class of better response
structure includes two symmetric forms). The four classes are as follows :
Class 1 : a b c> > >0 0 0, ,   ( the symmetric form is : a b c< < <0 0 0, ,  ).
Class 2 : a b c a b c< < > < > >0 0 0 0 0 0, , ( , , )      .
Class 3 : a b c a b c> < > < > <0 0 0 0 0 0, , ( , , )      .
Class 4 : a b c a b c> > < > < <0 0 0 0 0 0, , ( , , )      .
Classes 1-3
We use now the four principles in order to prove the CFP prop rty in the three first
cases.
Let G
a w b c z
u v2
0
0 00 0
=
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
   (a,b,c,u,v,w,z)>0.
Class 1: a b c> > >0 0 0 ,  , 11.
In this class of games row 2 is strictly dominated, and therefore we have actually a 1 3x
game. It is obvious that every 1 1xn n , ³ , has the CFP property. n
Class 2: a b c< > >0 0 0 ,  , 12.
By the improvement principle, the following diagram describes all possible moves
along a reduced path, that can be generated by a CFP process.
                                                 
11 The same argument holds for the case : a b c< < <0 0 0, ,  .
12 The same argument holds for the case : a b c< > >0 0 0, ,  .
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( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
11 12 13
21 22 23
® ®
¯ ­ ­
¬ ¬
      
Note  that simultaneously moves ( , ) ( , )11 22« and ( , ) ( , )12 23« are impossible in the
CFP process, since the meaning of such moves according to the structure of the game,
is that at least one of the points in A = {( , ),( , ),( , ),( , )}11 22 12 23 is played only once
among successive plays of other point in A . And this is a contradiction to the
increasing property of the reduced time sequence generated by the CFP process.
The separation principle implies that player 2 will not move between column 1 and
column 3. So, we can omit all arrows between these columns. This leaves us with :
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
11 12 13
21 22 23
® ®
¯ ­ ­
¬ ¬
      
Note that all the paths lead to one of the pure equilibrium point, and by the stability
principle, if the process lands on pure equilibrium point, it will stay there forever. So,
we  can conclude that every CFP process approaches equilibrium in case 2. n
Class 3: a b c> >0 0 , <0 , 13.
By the improvement a d the separation principle, the following diagram describes all
possible moves along a reduced path generated by a CFP process.
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
11 12 13
21 22 23
® ®
­ ¯ ­
¬ ¬
      
By the stability principle, without loss of generality, we can consider only arrows that
do not point towards the equilibrium point ( , )13 . This give us the following diagram :
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
11 12 13
21 22 23
®
­ ¯
¬ ¬
 
      
So the only potential non-converging process must cycle between :
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )...11 12 22 21 11® ® ® ®
                                                 
13 The same argument holds for the case : a b c> < >0 0 0, ,  .
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Apply the reduction principle to conclude that the process must approach equilibrium
in this case.14 n
Class 4
The following gameG is a typical game of class 4:
G
a w b z
u
a b u w z=
-
-
>
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , , , , )
0 0
0 00 1 1
0     .
Without loss of generality, assume that w uz>  , since otherwise column 2 is almost
always15 strictly dominated, and by the continuation of the CFP, the column player will
not use this column for ever, since otherwise we have a contradiction to the increasing
of the reduced time sequence generated by the CFP process.
Let ( ,( , ))x b t1  be a CFP in G  , and let { } { ),
*T z k kk k and  0£ £  , be the time
sequence and the reduced path associated with the process respectively. By the
stability principle , we can assume without loss of generality , that these sequences are
infinite. By the separation principle, for sufficient late stage, the column player will not
switch from column 1 to column 3 and  vice versa. By the improvement principle, the
player may move from z k( ) to z k( )+1  only according to the following arrows :
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
11 12 13
21 22 23
® ®
­ ­ ¯
¬ ¬
      
Since the simultaneously move ( , ) ( , )22 11® is impossible by the CFP process , the
reduced path induces only two cycle forms:
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
11 12 13
21 22 23
® ®
­ ¯
¬ ¬
                 
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
11 12 13
21 22 23
®
­ ¯
¬
   
   six point cycle                             four point cycle
Since the process lands in the point (1,2) infinite times, round n n, , ,....  = 12  is defined
as the n th  time in which the process lands in the point (1,2). The initial point of each
round is naturally the point (1,2).
                                                 
14 Note that the 2 2x sub-game induced by the process is best response equivalent to a 2 2x zero-sum
game.
15 We say that a strategy x of player i is almost always strictly dominated, if the set B x( ) has
measure 0.
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We proceed to prove that a CFP process can not generate only six point cycles, and
therefore it must generate also four point cycles. Later we will prove that if the process
generates once the four point cycle, then it generates only this cycle for ever. Apply
the reduction principle to conclude that the process approaches equilibrium in this
case.
Denote by x i jij
n   =1,2  ,  =1,2,3 , the amount of time spent playing in the point ( , )i j
up to (including) round n n  , = 123, , ,...
Denote by i jij
n   =1,2  ,  =1,2,3 , the amount of time spent playing in the point ( , )i j
in round n n  , = 123, , ,...
A CFP generating only six point cycles, can be described by the difference equations
((8.3)-(8.8)). Each equations describes the variables xij
n  at times in which the CFP
switches (given in parentheses) from point to point in the six point cycle ( equations
(8.1) and (8.2) refer to previous round). n > 0 indicates the number of the round,
while x i j mij
m   =1,2  ,  =1,2,3 , £ 0, assigns the initial amount of the point ( , )i j
before the first time generating this cycle.
The equations are as follows :
(8.1)  ax ax bx bx x xn n n n n n11
2
21
1
12
1
22
1
13
1
23
1- - - - - -+ + + = + (( , ) ( , ))21 11® .
(8.2)  wx wx wx ux ux uxn n n n n n11
1
12
1
13
1
21
1
22
1
23
1- - - - - -+ + = + + (( , ) ( , ))11 12® .
(8.3)  zx zx zx x x xn n n n n n11
1
12 13
1
21
1
22
1
23
1- - - - -+ + = + + (( , ) ( , ))12 13® .
(8.4)  ax ax bx bx x xn n n n n n11
1
21
1
12 22
1
13 23
1- - - -+ + + = + (( , ) ( , ))13 23® .
(8.5)  zx zx zx x x xn n n n n n11
1
12 13 21
1
22
1
23
- - -+ + = + + (( , ) ( , ))23 22® .
(8.6)  wx wx wx ux ux uxn n n n n n11
1
12 13 21
1
22 23
- -+ + = + + (( , ) ( , ))22 21® .
(8.7)  ax ax bx bx x xn n n n n n11
1
21 12 22 13 23
- + + + = + (( , ) ( , ))21 11® .
(8.8)  wx wx wx ux ux uxn n n n n n11 12 13 21 22 23+ + = + +  (( , ) ( , ))11 12® .
We will show that these equations yield a contradiction. By subtraction pairs of
equations (given in parentheses) we obtain :
(8.9)  zy yn n13 23=  (( . ) ( . )85 83- ).
(8.10) wy wy wy uyn n n n12 13 22 23+ = +  (( . ) ( . )86 82- ).
(8.11)wy uyn n11 21=  (( . ) ( . )88 86- ).
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(8.12) ay by yn n n21 22 23+ = (( . ) ( . )87 84- ).
(8.13)  ay by yn n n11
1
12 13
- + = (( . ) ( . )84 81- ).
Using equations (8.9)-(8.13)  give us :
(8.14)  y y
zu
w
b
zu
w
y
b
aw
w uz bn n n11 11
1
121 1= - - - - +
- ( ( )) ( ( )( )).
This yields :y ryn n11 11
1< -  where 0 1< = <r zu w/ .  Thus, lim
n
ny
®¥
=11 0.
On the other hand, since ( ) / (( )( ))w uz z w u- + +1 is the length of the set
B i( ) column , we obtain :
(8.15) y w uz z w un12 1 0> - + + > "( ) / (( )( ))    n>1.
But  equation (8.15) contradicts, by equation (8.14), the convergence ofy n11 to z ro
when n approaches infinity.
We showed that there is no a stage, such that a CFP process  generates only six point
cycles from this stage on. Thus, every CFP process generates four point cycles
infinitely often. Now we will show that if a CFP generates the four point cycle at some
stage, then it will generate only four point cycles from this stage on.
A CFP process generating the four point cycle for some n > 0 , can be described by
the following  equations ((8.16)-(8.19)) :
(8.16)  zx zx zx x x xn n n n n n11
1
12 13
1
21
1
22
1
23
1- - - - -+ + = + + (( , ) ( , ))12 13® .
(8.17)  zx zx zx x x xn n n n n n11
1
12 13
1
21
1
22
1
23
1- - - - -+ + = + + (( , ) ( , ))12 13® .
(8.18)  zx zx zx x x xn n n n n n11
1
12 13 21
1
22
1
23
- - -+ + = + +  (( , ) ( , ))23 22® .
(8.19)  ax ax bx bx x xn n n n n n11
1
21
1
12 22 13 23
- -+ + + = +  (( , ) ( , ))22 12® .
The subtraction (8.19)-(8.17) yields :
(8.20)  by yn n22 23= .
By the improvement principle, the unique escape route from the four point cycl , could
be by moving from the point (2,2) to the point (2,1). We will show that if the process
lands on (2,2) after one round through the four point cycle, then the next move will be
necessarily to (1,2) and not to (2,1). That is, the process will induce only  four point
cycles for ever.
Suppose in negation that the process induces the fo r point cycle in round n -1,
n > 1, and immediately after that the process moves from (2,2) to (2,1), that is, leaves
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the four point cycle. Then, the next move according to the improvement principle is
from (2,1) to (1,1). The route ( , ) ( , ) ( , )22 21 11® ®  implies :
(8.21)ay by yn n n21 22 23+ = .
Where y n22 is the time which is needed to move from (2,2) to (2,1), and y
n
22 is the time
which is needed to move from (2,2) to (1,2). Because of the geometrical structure of
the sets B i i( ) , ,column   = 123, we obtain that,
(8.22)  y yn n22 22> .
Equations (8.20) , (8.21), and (8.22) yield that y n21 0= . But this is a contradiction to
our assumption about the  escape of the four point cycle, that is, the move from (2,2)
to (2,1). n
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